ticularly influenced the new literature. The experiences of other plantation societies have suggested new approaches to the study of southern history, and, following a decade of lavish attention to slavery and the antebellum South, researchers have extended their interests into the post-Reconstruction era. As with the study of slavery and the Old South, class, labor, and race relations and their ideological manifestations have been central points of concern. Generally, recent literature has tended to stress the distinctiveness of southern society rather than its similarity with the states to the north, and in varying degrees has emphasized continuity from the Old South to the New rather than change. The trend seems clearly away from "psychological" explanations for southern political behavior-mythology, romanticism, separate and nationally unique historical experiences, individual and psychological racism, and the like.2 Instead recent studies, which have often been Marxist or quasi-Marxist in orientation, have tended to link the attitudes and ideologies of social groups to the labor system, social structure, economic organization, and class relationships in the region. Doubtless, Eugene D. Genovese is the scholar most responsible for laying the foundations for new directions in southern historiography, although Barrington Moore and William A. Williams have been important sources of theory. 3 Genovese has emphasized the "special social, economic, political, ideological, and psychological content" of antebellum southern society. Although a part of the world capitalist economy, the South, according to Genovese, "did not have an essentially market society" and consequently was basically different from the increasingly laissez-faire society of northern states. The prebourgeois southern planter class espoused an ideology of paternalism that bore little resemblance to the free labor ideology popular among northern elites and especially those who joined the Republican party.4 Such differences ultimately produced civil war.
The Civil War and Emancipation broke the national power of the southern planters, but the extent to which "their way of life and its attendant ideology went down also" has become the central question of contemporary scholarship.5 If the Old South was an established and prosperous society with its own economic, social, and ideological foundations, why would such a society so quickly collapse in the wake of Appomattox and the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly since the Radical Republican attempt to reconstruct that society ended in failure? The answer to this question remains debatable, but at least for the moment the initiative has plainly passed to the proponents of continuity.
Only the boldest scholars have suggested that nothing very important happened during the 1860s; yet a variety of studies have documented important elements of continuity that survived the transition. Economic historians con-tinue to disagree about the causes of southern postwar poverty, but they are largely in agreement that the South remained economically distinct from the rest of the nation long after the end of Reconstruction.6 Some works, such as Jay R. Mandle's The Roots of Black Poverty, have focused on the plantation as the central institution in southern life and have insisted that plantation agriculture continued to dominate southern development through the first third of the twentieth century.7 Other recent studies have revived the once popular theory that the Civil War consolidated the South's position as a dependent colonial appendage to the North. Even if the South was in Joseph Persky's apt term a "favored colony," its peripheral position as an internal colony was, as Woodward argued in Origins of the New South, a central element in shaping its political relations with the northern core. 8 Urban historians have tended in recent years to study southern urbanization within a regional context and to suggest that southern cities, rather than being the aggressive vanguards of the New South, were economically, culturally, racially, and in a variety of other ways strongly influenced if not substantially shaped by the surrounding countryside. As David R. Goldfield has argued, ruralism, race, and colonialism molded nationally distinctive southern urban communities within a nationally distinctive region.9 Howard N. Rabinowitz has demonstrated that race relations changed less dramatically during the post-Civil War era than had previously been assumed. Not only did segregation become the normal form of race relations soon after Emancipation but it was largely preceded by exclusion of blacks altogether rather than integration. A concept so encompassing as the Prussian Road to capitalism raises almost as many questions as it answers. The theory includes a number of assumptions regarding the solidarity within a dominant class, the nature of class conflict, and the reality of ruling class "hegemony," the latter being defined as the ability of a ruling class to convert the rest of society to its ideology, that are not altogether self-evident, especially to non-Marxist scholars. The very nature of this approach to the study of southern history may well tend to exaggerate the extent of continuity between the Old South and the New. Yet the studies by Billings and Wiener have focused attention on fundamental social and political questions. It is true that coercive forms of labor control remained common in the region long after the demise of slavery, and it is surely arguable that the South moved toward industrializa-tion without establishing a bourgeois "political and social democracy." At any rate conventional wisdom no longer assumes that the Redeemers "were of middle-class origin, having but nominal connections with the old planter regime and with primarily an industrial, capitalist outlook." 13 A number of state studies published over the past dozen or so years have suggested that Redeemer economic policies were less oriented toward business and industrial development than had been generally assumed. Governing a poverty-stricken region, Bourbon governments could hardly fail to favor economic progress. Five states gave tax concessions to new industry, several continued at least for a time the Reconstruction policy of providing state aid for railroad construction, and none showed a noticeable interest in conserving public lands. Yet, nine of the eleven southern states adopted new constitutions during the 1870s and 1880s, and they consistently denied state monetary support to private endeavors and in other ways circumscribed expenditures for the internal improvements that would have been necessary to promote rapid industrial growth. The Bourbon preoccupation with social stability, low taxes, and limited government does not necessarily suggest a governing elite preoccupied with economic development. James Tice Moore, after surveying the literature on the Bourbon period, concluded: "Recent state studies for the most part suggest that traditionalist, agriculturally oriented elites grasped the New South as firmly as they had the Old." 14 These trends in southern scholarship are apt to spur renewed interest in the spokesmen for the New South. The standard study of the subject remains Paul M. Gaston 27 Other studies have taken a basically different approach to progressivism. In a work on Virginia progressivism published more than a decade ago, Raymond H. Pulley concluded that "the reform impulse sprang from the conserving or reactionary tendencies inherent in the culture of the Commonwealth rather than from a desire to reconcile the state to the march of modern America." 28 As studies of national progressivism have increasingly tended to identify the movement with elitist and corporate capitalist values, Pulley's description of an established leadership, threatened by independent movements, launching a program to restore and buttress the old order has gained broader acceptability. A recent study of the period in a Deep South state reports "Progressive reform in Georgia was conservative, elitist, and above all racist." 29 This trend in scholarship received its most vigorous and most impressive expression in J. Morgan Kousser's The Shaping of Southern Politics. According to Kousser's interpretation, southern progressivism was a reaction to lower class insurgency that threatened the Democratic party's domination of political power in the South. Democratic elites responded with a "revolt against democracy" that sought "the stabilization of society, especially the economy, in the interests of the local establishedpowers, at the expense of the lower strata of society in the South, and sometimes at the expense of out-ofstate corporations." The leading proponents of this program of disfranchisement and reform were plantation elites who "bore striking resemblances to antebellum 'patricians."' 30 Kousser's study emphasizes the disfranchisement movement and may not offer an adequate interpretation for progressivism as a whole. Yet, if the Redeemers were more closely associated with conservative agricultural values than had once been believed, then it would not be surprising to learn that the Progressive "search for order" contained a strong element of reaction. Modernization theorists have frequently advanced a dual economy thesis which assumes that changes in an economically underdeveloped area would come first to the cities, thereby for a time dividing the modernizing cities from the "traditional" countryside. It may well be that planter oriented rural Progressives endeavored to buttress the old social order with disfranchisement and other programs, that urban Progressive elites promoted various modernizing reforms as Kirby and others have suggested, and that a considerable number of farmers and townsmen retreated into a defense of local values that included a politics of demagoguery and a largely ineffective opposition to northern based corporate enterprise. In any event, the "synthesis" fashioned during the Progressive era, as George B. Tindall has observed, "governed southern politics through the first half of the twentieth century." 31 Although students of southern politics have devoted relatively little attention to the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, the literature would overwhelmingly support Tindall's observation. During these years, the region solidified its reputation as "the benighted South," "the Nation's No. 1 economic problem," and the home of race-baiting demagogues. V. 0. Key, after examining the politics of the period, stated "The South may not be the nation's number one political problem, as some northerners assert, but politics is the South's number one problem." 32 The current state of scholarship on the post-Progressive era strongly suggests that, whatever the positive features of Progressive reform, the results were clearly limited.
Key identified the failures of southern politics with the one-party system. As Key explained, "in the confusions and distractions of one-party politics broad issues of economic philosophy are often obscured or smothered by irrelevant appeals, sectional loyalties, local patriotism, personal candidacies, and, above all, by the specter of the black man." More fundamentally, Key emphasized the success of white elites in the black-belt plantation counties in impressing "on an entire region a philosophy agreeable to its necessities and succeeded for many decades in maintaining a regional unity in national politics to defend these necessities." Although often challenged, socioeconomically privileged whites of the black belt emerged victorious from the crucial political crises in southern history and were the primary architects of the system of white supremacy and disfranchisement that the one-party system rested upon and defended. Normally allied with town merchants, businessmen, and industrialists, plantation-oriented whites induced other groups within southern society "to subordinate to the race question all great social and economic issues that tend to divide people into opposing parties." 33 Whatever the merits of such a research strategy, it may not be adequate to answer the more fundamental questions posed by recent southern political developments. In 1940 the raison d'etre of southern state governments was the protection of white supremacy and social stability; thirty years later their central purpose was the promotion of business and industrial development. Key emphasized conflict between haves and have-nots, which often took the form of dissension between black belt and hills or city and countryside. But in terms of ideology and public policy, a good argument could be made that the have-nots had lost-or at least were well along the way to losing-the war by the time Key described it. Beginning with Mississippi's Balance Agriculture With Industry program in 1936, all the southern states established industry hunting agencies and structured programs of tax concessions and public support for industrial development. All enacted right-to-work provisions and firmly placed state authority on the side of entrepreneurial and corporate profits.39 During the same period the southern states in varying degrees vastly improved public education, expanded or originated the merit system in public bureaucracy, and adopted more rational procedures for collecting and disbursing public monies. The elimination of the one-party system, disfranchisement, legislative malapportionment, and de jure segregation was of great importance to the triumph of these policies, but they do not appear to have been closely related to the sporadic battles between the haves and havenots.
Instead, these developments suggest that the emerging periodization of New South politics may focus on the 1930s or 1940s as a great and, as yet, an ill-understood watershed. Recent interpretations indicate that in fundamental ways there was considerable continuity during the decades following Reconstruction. The labor relations of plantations and mill villages, the social structure with its foundation resting on caste relationships, and an ideology that for want of a better term is usually labeled paternalism may have provided an underlying stability that limited the impact of the undeniable changes that swept across the South during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These tendencies in the literature are imminently debatable and are apt to fuel an abundance of scholarly controversy. But, then, as V. 0. Key observed: "Of books about the South there is no end." 40 
